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Abstract: 
This study focuses on the threat effect of the activation reform of the Finnish la-
bour market support system in 2006. In practice, participation in the labour mar-
ket programmes became mandatory for the long-term recipients of the labour 
market support. Mandatory programme participation may provide incentive for 
some individuals to look for work in order to avoid the training programmes. The 
study examines whether the activation reform of 2006 encouraged individuals in 
the target group to look for employment. According to the results mandatory pro-
gramme participation has no effect on the probability to find a job or to leave 
labour market support for some other reason. Conversely, the long-term recipi-
ents’ participation in the labour market programmes has increased considerably 
due to the activation reform. 
Key words: labour market support, activation, unobserved heterogeneity 
JEL classes: J640 
Tiivistelmä:  
Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan vuonna 2006 toimeenpannun työmarkkinatuen 
aktivointiuudistuksen vaikutuksia. Käytännössä uudistus tarkoitti yli 500 päivää 
passiivista työmarkkinatukea saaneiden työttömien tehostettua ohjaamista aktii-
visille työvoimapoliittisille toimenpiteille. Mielenkiinnon kohteena on erityisesti 
aktivointiuudistuksen mahdollinen uhkavaikutus. Uhkavaikutuksella tarkoitetaan 
tässä yhteydessä tilannetta, jossa passiivisen työmarkkinatuen saajat pyrkivät 
työllistymään avoimille työmarkkinoille tai muutoin poistumaan passiiviturvan 
piiristä ennen työvoimapoliittisiin toimenpiteisiin ohjaamista. Tulosten mukaan 
lisääntyneellä aktivoinnin uhalla ei ollut tilastollisesti merkitsevää vaikutusta 
avoimille työmarkkinoille työllistymiseen tai muuhun poistumaan passiivisen 
työmarkkinatuen piiristä. Sen sijaan työvoimapoliittisille toimenpiteille siirtymi-
sen todennäköisyys kasvoi selvästi aktivointikaudella.   
Asiasanat: työmarkkinatukiuudistus, aktivointi, havaitsematon heterogeenisuus 
JEL-luokat: J640 
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1. Introduction 
The Finnish labour market support system was reformed in 2006. The major aim 
of the reform was to create more incentives for the long-term unemployed to re-
turn to work. Thus, participation in the labour market programmes became man-
datory for labour market support recipients whose passive labour market support 
spell exceeded 500 days. The period after 500 passive support days is denoted 
the “new activation period”. In practice individuals belonging to the target group 
were guided more efficiently to participate in the active labour market pro-
grammes. In order to achieve this goal, the reform included refusal of labour 
market support benefits for those who refused to participate in the active labour 
market programmes during the new activation period. Additionally, the local 
municipalities were given financial incentives to allocate long-term unemployed 
individuals into active labour market programmes.  
The activation of labour market support recipients may have twofold effects. 
Firstly, the activation may in general promote employment prospects of labour 
market support recipients. The increase in activation (or participation) rate may 
improve individuals’ qualifications and help them back to work. There is a wide 
literature on the employment effects of the active programmes, while there is no 
consensus on the effects. The effects depend at least on the type of the pro-
gramme and target group of the programme. Secondly, increased mandatory acti-
vation may provide incentive for some individuals to look for work in order to 
avoid training programmes. This effect is known as the “threat effect”. The focus 
of this study is in the threat effects of the activation reform instead of the effects 
of different labour market programmes. 
The Finnish reform of 2006 can be seen as a part of the worldwide development 
from welfare to “workfare”. The concept of “workfare” goes back to 1980s when 
US government paid increasing attention to the misuse of benefits. Since then 
there has been tendency towards workfare in many countries including United 
Kingdom, Netherlands and Denmark. In practice the concept of workfare means 
that requirements for welfare schemes are made more restrictive and means 
tested.  
For example, In USA the TANF program (Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families) replaced the ADF program (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) 
in 1996.1 As a consequence of the TANF reform the states were obliged to offer 
employment or labour market programmes for the benefit recipients. At first, the 
states were obliged to employ 20 percent share of the target group and in 2001 
the share was increased to 50 percent. Furthermore, benefit recipients were 
                                              
1 The ADF program was implemented already in the 1940s. 
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obliged to participate in the programmes, or otherwise authorities may reject the 
benefit application (or at least decrease the benefit level).  
Moffitt (2008) has summarized the evaluations of TANF reform. According to 
the Moffitt the TANF reform as a whole increased employment and earnings and 
reduced poverty and the number of welfare recipients. However, the positive ef-
fects were achieved solely because of the decreased use of benefits among fe-
males. Moffitt argues that as much as 40 percent of those females who did not 
qualify for benefits left labour market after reform. Additionally, the reform had 
no significant effect on those individuals who remained on the benefit.  
The nearest counterpart to the Finnish activation period of labour market support 
can be found from Denmark, where unemployment benefits periods are divided 
into two different periods. The passive period at the beginning has duration of 2 
years in Denmark. During this passive period unemployed individuals generally 
search for employment without any further guidance. After the passive period 
those who have not found employment enter into activation period. During which 
unemployed individuals are obliged to participate in the active labour market 
programmes. A refusal to participate in the active labour market programmes 
leads to sanctions. It is possible for administration to reject unemployment bene-
fits application or at least to cut the benefits level.  
Several studies in various countries have examined the role of mandatory pro-
gramme participation (Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Black, 2003; Blundell et al. 
2004; Geerdsen, 2006; Rosholm and Svarer 2007). According to the Blundell et 
al. (2000) the New Deal for Young People in the U.K. significantly increased 
transitions to employment by 5 percentage points. The New Deal for Young Peo-
ple included job search assistance for unemployed and employment subsidies to 
employers. However, it is unclear whether the positive effect was due to the “car-
rot” of the job search assistance or the “stick” of the stricter monitoring of job 
search or both of them. In contrast, Black (2003) has found that most of the posi-
tive employment effects of mandatory programme participation were due to the 
threat effects. 
In addition, Geerdsen (2006) has found out that in Danish unemployment insur-
ance system mandatory programme participation motivates individuals to find 
employment prior to participation i.e. there is threat effect. Rosholm and Svarer 
(2007) have also found strong and positive threat effects in Denmark. However, 
Rosholm and Svarer found that the threat effect is not present for the long-term 
unemployed individuals. This may be due to the fact the long-term unemployed 
individuals may need qualifications and skills that the active labour market train-
ing programmes offer. Therefore, they may expect to gain from the labour market 
programmes and look for to participate in them. 
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This paper shows that the activation reform of Finnish labour market support had 
no significant effect on the probability of finding employment for long-term un-
employed. In other words, the study in hand examines the possible threat effect 
of mandatory programme participation for the long-term unemployed individu-
als, who have accumulated more than 500 days of passive labour market support. 
In order to identify the threat effect I exploit the activation reform of 2006 of 
Finnish labour market support system that included mandatory participation for 
long-term unemployed individuals. The change in legislation can be used as a 
natural experiment, since it provides a source of variation across individuals. Be-
cause of the reform the timing of compulsory programme participation varies 
between different individuals. The new activation period may start at different 
stages of individual labour market support spell depending on start date of the 
labour market support spell, accumulation of previous passive labour market 
support spells and distance to the implementation date of the reform (1.1.2006). 
Obviously, there are also spells and individuals who will not enter into new acti-
vation period at all. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses on 
the role of the labour market support in the Finnish labour market. Section three 
introduces the data and the empirical analysis. Section four presents the results 
and discussion. Section five concludes. 
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2. Finnish labour market support system and the 
activation reform of 2006 
Three types of subsidies are available to unemployed individuals in Finland. Ac-
cording to the Finnish legislation earnings related unemployment benefits and 
basic unemployment allowance are targeted to the individuals who meet specific 
condition regarding the employment history. Firstly, members of various unem-
ployment compensation funds can claim earnings related unemployment benefit 
and it can be paid for up to 500 days. Secondly, the basic unemployment allow-
ance can be paid for those who have been employed at least 10 months during the 
two years preceding the unemployment. Basic unemployment allowance is also 
paid for a maximum of 500 days. Thirdly, those who do not qualify for earnings 
related unemployment allowance or basic unemployment allowance could apply 
for labour market support. Labour market support is means tested and it covers 
unemployed job seekers who enter labour market for the first time or who other-
wise have no recent work experience. In addition, those individuals who have 
exhausted their 500 passive day eligibility for the basic or earnings related un-
employment allowance may be eligible for labour market support. Those indi-
viduals who do not qualify for labour market support are entitled to apply for 
social assistance. 
 
Labour market support spells include passive and active spells. In this context 
passive spell refers to unemployment and active spell refers to participation in 
the active labour market programmes. Placement on labour market support forms 
the active component of the labour market support (see for example Hämäläinen 
and Ollikainen, 2004). It consists of practical training and coaching for work life 
while the labour market support is paid. Practical training is targeted to the la-
bour market support recipients below the age of 25 without vocational degree, 
while coaching for work life is aimed at recipients who are 25 years of age or 
older (or who have vocational degree). Placement on labour market support is 
mostly allocated to the young people and role of the other active programmes is 
insignificant for the unemployed persons under 20 years of age. However, along 
with placement on labour market support activation may sometimes include 
some other labour market programmes. This is especially the case for the unem-
ployed persons over 25 years of age. In addition, active labour market support 
spell may be vocational labour market training that consists of classroom and 
practical training that may be offered as supplementary training, continuing pro-
fessional education or as joint purchase training together with an employer. It 
provides a formal qualification or part of a degree. Preparative labour market 
training is aimed at offering basic skills needed in job-seeking. It may also pre-
cede vocational training if an unemployed person needs specific skills before en-
tering vocational training. Private sector employment subsidy is a subsidy that is 
paid to private employer who employs unemployed individual. Public sector em-
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ployment subsidy is similar measure for public institutions. Active spells may 
also contain different rehabilitation measures.   
 
When labour market support was implemented for the first time in 1994 it was 
sketched to be a system to support young people who became unemployed for 
the first time, while long-term unemployed individuals were only secondary tar-
get group. It was approximated that only quarter of recipients would be long-term 
unemployed. However, despite good economic times in the late 1990s and early 
2000s in Finland there were 130 000 labour market support recipients in the end 
of the year 2005. Of them only 17% were under 25 years old. On the other hand 
58% of recipients had used labour market support over 500 days.  
 
Since the early 1990s the Finnish labour market support system has progressed to 
the point where it is basic security for the long-term unemployed. This develop-
ment and tendency towards workfare has generated a need for reforming the la-
bour market support system. In Finland there have been several reforms in 1990s 
and 2000s concerning labour market support system. These reforms have in-
cluded new requirements for applicants and the preconditions for the labour mar-
ket support benefits are tightened. For example, young people less than 25 years 
old and without vocational education are required to apply for active labour mar-
ket programmes in order to qualify for labour market support benefit after the 
reform of 1997. The law of rehabilitative work was introduced in 2001 to im-
prove long-term unemployed individuals’ prospects for employment. According 
to the law of rehabilitative work local municipalities have obligation to offer re-
habilitation measures for those unemployed who do not meet preconditions for 
other types of labour market programmes. The law of rehabilitative work in-
cluded individual activation plans for young individuals less than 25 years of age 
and who had accumulated over 500 days of passive labour market support and 
who already have individual job search plan. 
 
In the beginning of the 2006 labour market support was reformed once again. 
The reform of labour market support was aimed at long-term unemployed indi-
viduals. Labour market support recipients whose passive labour market support 
period exceeded 500 days were entered into the new activation period. In addi-
tion, those who have used maximum time of earning related unemployment 
benefits entered into the activation period already after 180 days of passive la-
bour market support.2  Reform included refusal of labour market support benefits 
from individuals who have refused to participate in the labour market pro-
grammes during the new activation period. In addition, local municipalities were 
offered financial incentive to guide the long-term unemployed individuals into 
active labour market programmes. After the reform, the Finnish government 
bears costs associated with labour market programmes during the new activation 
                                              
2 These individuals are not included in the analysis.  
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period. While before the reform, the local municipalities had to defray the costs 
of labour market programmes. On the other hand, costs associated with the pas-
sive support for individuals whose accumulation of passive labour market sup-
port exceeded 500 days were shared equally between government and local 
municipalities. Hence, more responsibility of the long-term unemployed is put to 
the local authorities. This can be seen as an important feature of the reform, be-
cause there were claims that before the reform local municipalities avoided their 
responsibility to allocate long-term unemployed into active labour market pro-
grammes. After the reform active labour market programmes are still allocated 
for the labour market support recipients before the new activation period. How-
ever, during the new activation period supply of services and labour market pro-
grammes is increased, which can be detected in the participation rates. 
 
The aim of this study is to distinguish the effect of the activation reform from the 
trend development. In other words, the aim is to identify threat effect of manda-
tory programme participation introduced by activation reform. Figure 1 shows 
that between 2003 and 2008 total amount of passive labour market support re-
cipients and long-term recipients of passive support has decreased while the 
number of active labour market programme participants increased. This devel-
opment reveals that although the overall unemployment rate has decreased con-
siderably, participation in the active labour market programmes has increased 
among long-term unemployed individuals after the reform. It is noteworthy that 
participation has increased both in absolute value and as a percentage of all sup-
port recipients i.e. participation rate has increased considerably among the indi-
viduals whose accumulation of passive support is over 500 days. It seems to be 
on this ground that the aim of the reform concerning programme participation is 
achieved. In the next chapter, I examine whether the reform has effect on the em-
ployment prospects of the labour market support recipients.  
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Figure 1  Labour market support recipients 
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Source: Employment and Economic Development Centres 
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3. Data and empirical analysis 
3.1 Data 
 
The data used in this study is gathered from the registers of Social Insurance In-
stitution of Finland (KELA) and Ministry of Labour. The panel data includes de-
tailed information on all labour market support spells commencing in 2003-2007. 
The resulting data contain a wide range of information on individuals’ socio-
economic and demographic characteristics as well as information on passive la-
bour market support spells and labour market programmes.3 I focus on the spells 
beginning in 2004-2006. There are 153949 individuals, who have a total of 
298229 spells beginning in 2004-2006. However, in order to limit the number of 
observations estimations are performed for 20 % random sample of the data. It is 
possible to construct transition states for passive spells. I have divided transitions 
to three different categories. One state contains those who find employment in 
labour market and other state contains those who start in active labour market 
programme. Residual state contains all other exit destinations. 
 
The data is described in table 1. Table reveals that recipients of the passive la-
bour market support have in general long unemployment histories. The average 
of the passive days at beginning of the spells is over 500 days. Table 1 also 
shows that the average duration of the (beginning) spells is 102 days whole for 
whole population and 176 days for long-term unemployed. Furthermore, indi-
viduals with long unemployment history are more likely to be older males with 
less education. In addition, individuals who have more than 500 days of passive 
support are less likely to find employment from open labour market than all la-
bour market support recipients. Instead, the long-term unemployed individuals 
participate more often in the active labour market programmes. Table 1 shows 
also that the number of passive labour market support spells has decreased stead-
ily in the period. In other words, the unemployment rate has decreased. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
3 Passive spell is broken if there is 7 days difference between different spells. 
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics  
 
All Spells Mean  Minimum Maximum Standard 
dev. 
Females, % 49.4    
Age, mean 28,4 15 65 28.4 
Passive days at the beginning of the spell, 
mean 
561.3 0 3649 711.1 
Spell length, days 102.5 1 1043 133.5 
     
Education:     
Basic education 36.5    
High school 41.9    
Secondary education 13.4    
Undergraduate education 6.4    
Graduate education 1.6    
     
Destination states for passive spells:     
Employed 18.6    
Labour market programme begins 33.2    
Studies  4.0    
Military service 2.0    
Employment office decisiona 13.4    
Passive spell continues to 2008 2.2    
Other exit destination stateb 26.6    
     
Number of spells:     
2004 102448    
2005 101428    
2006 94353    
Individuals 153949    
     
Over 500 unemployment days: Mean  Minimum Maximum Standard 
dev. 
Females, % 44.0    
Age, mean 37.5 18 65 10.8 
Passive days at the beginning of the spell, 
mean 
1376.2 500 3649 691.1 
Spell length, mean 175.9 1 1521 186.6 
     
Education     
Basic education 45.5    
High school 39.0    
Secondary education 6.0    
Undergraduate education 7.8    
Graduate education 1.7    
     
Destination states for passive spells:     
Employed 10.1    
Labour market programme begins 41.7    
Studies  1.1    
Military service 0.1    
Employment office decision 13.2    
Passive spell continues to 2008 5.7    
Other exit destination state 28.1    
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Number of spells:     
2004 34536    
2005 33557    
2006 31772    
Individuals 50875    
a Employment office decision means that for different reasons labour market support recipient does qual-
ify for support anymore b Other destinations include for example moving into other benefits or actual 
interruption of the labour market support.  
 
If the activation reform has a threat effect on the outcomes of the labour market 
support recipients, it may be possible to detect it by descriptive figures. In figure 
2 the hazard of leaving passive labour market support is compared before and 
after reform (2004 and 2006). The hazard curves are displayed only for the spells 
that have already lasted at least 300 days. This is due to the fact that follow-up 
data ends in January 2008 and there is only 250 support days per year.4 In addi-
tion, most of the passive labour market support spells end before duration of 500 
days. Figure 2 shows that probability of leaving passive labour market support 
has certainly increased between 2004 and 2006. This is mostly explained by the 
fact that the overall unemployment rate has decreased gradually between 2004 
and 2006. According to the Statistics Finland unemployment rate was 8.8 % in 
2004 and 7.7 % in 2006.  
 
Additionally, Figure 2 shows that in 2006 another upward shift is present for the 
probability of leaving passive support after 500 unemployment days i.e. the slope 
increases. This upward jump may be seen as the effect of the reform or as the 
threat effect. In other words, figure 2 reveals that the reform has increased exit 
rate from the passive labour market support. It seems to be that unemployed in-
dividuals leave passive support more likely after 500 days due to mandatory par-
ticipation in labour market programmes. Hence, it is possible that some 
individuals try to avoid active programmes and look for employment more inten-
sively as the activation period progresses. In addition, they may try to find some 
other exit out of the passive support before mandatory participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
4 Spells that started at 2004 are censored if ending date is greater than 31.12.2005 and spells that started at 
2006 are censored if ending date is greater than 31.12.2007. 
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Figure 2  Probability of leaving passive labour market support at different 
stages of the spell (for spells exceeding 300 days in 2004-2006 
when ignoring transition state). 
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Appendix 1 displays hazard rates of leaving passive labour market support for 
different exit destinations (employment, active labour market programmes and all 
other states). It seems to be that there is no difference in employment probability 
between years, whereas transitions into active labour market programmes and 
other destinations explain the upward shift in figure 2. This indicates that activa-
tion reform actually increased participation rates for the long-term unemployed. 
The descriptive figures also indicate that there is no sign of the threat effect for 
the employment hazard while there might be threat effect for the other exit haz-
ard.  
 
As a whole the increase in the exit rate from passive support can be regarded as a 
positive development. However, one has to remember that other exit destinations 
include various destination states. On one hand, it may be the case that labour 
market support is denied because support recipient has refused to participate in 
the labour market programmes. In this case unemployed individual can apply for 
the supplementary income support. On the other hand, it is possible that these 
individuals begin studying. Evidently, the previous situation can be considered as 
negative and the latter as positive development. 
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3.2 Empirical analysis 
The reform of 2006 introduced a new concept of the activation period for the 
long-term unemployed individuals. On one hand, increased activation may im-
prove individuals’ qualifications and reintroduce them back to the labour market. 
On the other hand, there may be individuals whose motivation to look for work 
increases simply due to compulsory training programme participation. That is, 
previous studies have found that mandatory labour market programmes may in 
fact motivate the unemployed to look for employment or otherwise try to leave 
the support prior to start day of the activation programme. In this case the threat 
effect can also be described as the effect of the activation reform. 
 
This study tests whether the mandatory activation increased individuals’ hazard 
of leaving passive labour market support. The model for hazard of leaving pas-
sive labour market support is estimated in competing-risks framework for em-
ployment, active labour market programmes and all other exits. The threat effect 
is identified as an explanatory variable that describes individuals’ remaining time 
until the new activation period begins. This variable counts how many months 
individuals have left until the new activation period begins. The threat effect is 
present if hazard of finding employment or otherwise leaving passive support 
increases when the new activation period is approaching. That is, employment 
probability jumps up after 500 days accumulation of passive support.  
 
The variation in the threat effect variable comes from three sources. Firstly, the 
activation period was implemented 1.1.2006 and distance to the implementation 
date affects to the remaining time until the activation period starts. Secondly, the 
remaining time until the start of activation period diminishes as labour market 
support spell progress. Thirdly, the distance to 500 days at the beginning of the 
spells differs due to the previous passive spells.5 The distance to the activation 
period variable is identified only if one these factors is excluded from the model. 
In the estimation I have omitted the distance to the implementation date based on 
the assumption that implementation date does not have any effect on the indi-
viduals’ labour market behaviour other than through decreasing distance to the 
activation period.  
 
In practice the spells in the sample can be divided into five categories. On one 
hand, there are two cases concerning individuals whose market support period 
starts during 2006 or later. Firstly, there are individuals who have already more 
than 500 days accumulation of passive support and activation period starts im-
mediately. Secondly, some individuals have to wait until passive period exceeds 
500 days. On the other hand, there are two cases concerning those whose labour 
market support spell starts before the implementation date (1.1.2006) of the re-
form. If the spell is still in progress in 1.1.2006 some individuals may have more 
                                              
5 Accumulation of passive labour market support days varies between 0 and 3649 days in the data. 
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than 500 passive days and activation period starts immediately. Of course, there 
are individuals who have to wait until 500 unemployment days is realized in 
2006 or later. Finally, some individuals do not enter into activation period at all. 
 
Unobserved heterogeneity is modelled as random effect using framework intro-
duced by Heckman and Singer (1982, 1984) and the identification of mass points 
and their probabilities is based on assumption that each individual’s unobserved 
part of the hazard is constant within and between spells. Suppose that destination 
state is employment (active programmes, other states) and all other exits are cen-
sored. There are individuals i = 1,…, N who enter each state at time t = 0 and are 
observed j periods, at which person either remains in the state or leaves the state. 
Suppose also that each individual belongs to the state v = 1,…,V, and that the 
membership in the each state is unobserved. The hazard function for an individ-
ual i belonging to the type v is: 
 
01 exp( exp( * ))t v ithv m b X b     , 
 
where 0b  is intercept and *itX b  incorporates the effects of explanatory covariates 
including distance to the new activation period. Mass points vm  are discrete 
points of support of multinomial distribution and probability of belonging to each 
type v is vp , while 1m  is normalized to be zero and 1
2
1
V
v
v
p p

  . In other words, 
intercept term is allowed to vary across different types. Thus, the contribution to 
the sample likelihood for individual with observed duration j can be written as: 
 
v[p * ( )*( /(1 )) ^ ]j j
v
L Sv j hv hv C  , 
 
where ( )Sv j  is a survivor function or probability of remaining in the state j peri-
ods  and C in censoring indicator (one for a completed spell).6  
 
The duration of the labour market support spell is also a time variant variable in 
the model. In addition, distance to 500 passive days at the beginning of the spell 
is included in the model as a time-invariant variable. Rest of the time-invariant 
background variables are age, gender, occupation and region. All variables ex-
cept age are modelled using dummy construct. Each labour market support dura-
tion dummy variable covers 2 months’ period going from 3 months to 35 months 
in passive unemployment. The variable for remaining passive period is modelled 
                                              
 6 Maximizing log likelihood function with respect to the unknown determinants hz and zp  is carried 
out with Stata 10.1 and hshaz module.  
  
 
 14 
 
with indicator variables covering 32 months period from 16 months to 12 months 
into activation period. 
 
It must be noted that I estimate three different mixed proportional hazard models 
(MPH) (see Van den Berg, 2000). The other alternative would be multivariate 
mixed proportional model (MMPH), that is to say model is estimated jointly and 
hazard rates are dependent. However, the identification of competing risks 
MMPH model is more difficult than separate MPH models due to the censoring 
and the fact that durations to the different exit destinations are dependent.  
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4. Results and discussion 
The odds ratios for mixed proportional hazard models are displayed in the Ap-
pendix 2.7  The results show that females have significantly lower probability of 
finding employment and lower probability of entering activation programmes. 
Individuals with higher education level appear to have higher probability of find-
ing employment and programme participation. Occupation has also significance 
on individuals’ labour market transitions. Results concerning regional differences 
show that individuals living outside Southern-Finland have a higher probability 
of participating in active labour market programmes whereas probability of find-
ing employment is usually lower. The distance to the 500 passive support days at 
the beginning of the spell has also significant effect on labour market transitions 
i.e. long term-unemployed individuals generally differ from those individuals 
who have short accumulation of passive labour market support benefits.  
 
Additionally, the results indicate negative duration dependence for employment 
hazard. However, duration dependence is less negative than in the homogenous 
model and significance levels are weaker. This is due to selection process where 
unemployed with good unobserved characteristics leave the state of interest. 
Hence, composition of those who have not left the state is worse than the compo-
sition of earlier (see Van den Berg, 2000). As a consequence, exit rate is more 
negative if we do not take into account unobserved characteristics. In addition, 
the other covariate effects are somewhat different compared to the homogenous 
model8. Table A1 also shows that duration dependence is positive for labour 
market programme participation and other exit hazards while homogenous mod-
els produced negative duration dependences.  
 
Figure 3 presents the estimated coefficients for the threat effect variable (distance 
to the activation period). There appears to be no threat effect present for em-
ployment hazard. All parameter values are insignificant or below one. This result 
is consistent with the descriptive analysis that also showed that there is no up-
ward shift in employment probability after 500 unemployment days. In other 
words, it seems to be that finding employment is difficult for those individuals 
whose accumulation of passive support exceeds 500 days. Compared to the 
Denmark, this result is consistent with the finding that the threat effect was not 
present for long-term unemployed individuals, although, in general the threat 
effect was strong (see Rosholm and Svarer, 2007). It is possible that long-term 
                                              
7 The modelling of unobserved heterogeneity produced three mass points for all three models. Results 
indicate that labour market support recipients can be divided into three groups. Firstly, there is a small 
group of individuals who have strong attachment to the labour market, low usage of active labour market 
programmes and low incidence of all other exits, compared to the reference group. Nevertheless, majority 
of individuals have low attachment to the labour market, high usage of labour market programmes and 
low incidence of all other exits, compared to the reference group. 
8 Full results are available upon request.  
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unemployed individuals need skills that labour market programmes offer and 
finding employment is not feasible.  
 
Figure 3  Estimated effect of activation reform on employment probability 
(Odds ratios) 
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However, it is obvious that different reforms may have different effects on dif-
ferent types of individuals. It must be noted that activation rates are considerably 
lower in Finland than in Denmark. This may be reflected in the fact that threat 
effect is weaker in Finland. According to the Geerdsen (2006) proportion of indi-
viduals participating in the programmes reaches 80% about 10 months into the 
activation period.  That is, proportion is close to full programme participation. In 
contrast, the target for overall programme participation rate has been 30% in 
Finland. Besides that, the unemployment benefit systems differ between coun-
tries. The study in hand focuses on Finnish labour market support, and there is no 
exactly similar system in Denmark. The studies in Denmark have scrutinized ac-
tivation of earnings related unemployment benefits system. As a result target 
groups for activation reforms differ considerably. In Denmark activation is aimed 
at young people, whereas in Finland labour market support recipients are typi-
cally older and they might have long unemployment history behind in earnings 
related unemployment benefits system. Thus, it is likely that mandatory partici-
pation in the labour market programmes affect differently to older people who 
may have longer unemployment histories and low prospects of finding employ-
ment. 
 
In addition, figure 4 shows that there seems to be no threat effect present for the 
other exit hazard, although the parameter of interest is positive and significant at 
the last follow-up point. This is likely to be due to the fact that follow-up data 
expires at the end of 2007. It is possible that the share of unknown exits increases 
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because of the practices adopted by the register administration.9 Additionally, 
figure 5 illustrates that activation reform indeed increased participation to the 
active programmes. In other words there is an upward jump in the programme 
hazard after 500 unemployment days.  
 
 
Figure 4  Estimated effect of activation reform on probability of other exits, 
excluding employment and active programmes (Odds ratios) 
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9 It is possible that ongoing spells are finished at the end of the follow-up data by the register administra-
tion. 
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Figure 5  Estimated effect of activation reform on programme participation 
probability (Odds ratios) 
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It seems to be evident that the Finnish labour market does not offer many oppor-
tunities for long-term unemployed individuals. The long-term unemployed indi-
viduals are highly dependent on the government support policies. The reform of 
2006 indeed activated long-term unemployed via labour market programmes, 
while the reform had no direct employment effects. Contrary to the descriptive 
part of the study, the reform did not increase probability of other exits from the 
passive labour market support. However, further research is needed to clarify the 
role of the other exits. It is possible that those who exit from passive support be-
came socially excluded or otherwise they may find some other way out of the 
unemployment. All in all the previous option is more likely. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This study has examined the effects of the activation reform of 2006 of Finnish 
labour market support system. After the reform programme participation became 
mandatory for the long-term recipients of labour market support. In practice, af-
ter the reform individuals in the target group can be allocated more efficiently to 
participate in the active labour market programmes. This reform may have two-
fold effects. Firstly, increased participation in the labour market programmes 
may in general promote employment prospects of labour market support recipi-
ents. Secondly, mandatory participation may also provide incentive for some in-
dividuals to look for work prior to participating in the labour market training 
programmes, i.e. the threat effect is present. This study focused on the existence 
of the threat effect of mandatory participation.  
 
It seems to be that mandatory participation in the training programmes does not 
improve job search effort or employment prospects for the long-term unem-
ployed. According to the results mandatory labour market programme participa-
tion has no threat effect on the long-term unemployed recipients of the labour 
market support. The threat of compulsory programme participation has no statis-
tically significant effect on the probability to be employed in labour market or to 
leave labour market support for some other reason. Conversely, the long-term 
unemployed recipients’ participation in the labour market programmes has in-
creased considerably due to the activation reform of 2006.  
 
Although the threat effect was not present in this case, further research is needed 
to scrutinize the role of the threat effect concerning different types of policy in-
terventions and other target groups. Some previous studies indicate that in some 
cases mandatory programmes can be utilized as a way to encourage individuals 
to look for employment more efficiently. For example, in Denmark there is evi-
dence that although in general the threat effect can be significant and strong, the 
effect is not necessarily present for the long-term unemployed. In addition, the 
threat effect is likely to be a more relevant issue in the case of earnings related 
benefits system, while recipients have considerably shorter unemployment histo-
ries. It is possible that the long-term unemployed simply cannot avoid mandatory 
training programmes due to the fact that they have very low employment pros-
pects and they may, on the contrary need and look for skills offered in the train-
ing programmes. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Figure A1  Employment probability for passive labour market support at dif-
ferent stages of the labour market support spell (for spells exceed-
ing 300 days in 2004-2006) 
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Figure A2  Probability of entering active programmes at different stages of the 
labour market support spell (for spells exceeding 300 days in 2004-
2006) 
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
300-320 320-340 340-360 360-380 380-400 400-420 420-440 440-460 460-480 480-500 500-520 520-540 540-560 560-580 580-600 600-620 620-640 640-660 660-680 680-700
Duration days
H
az
ar
d
2004 2006
 
 22 
 
Figure A2  Probability of all other exits at different stages of the labour market 
support spell (for spells exceeding 300 days in 2004-2006) 
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Table A1  Hazard estimates for background variables 
 
  Into employment Into active programmes Into other states 
  exp (coefficient) s.e exp (coefficient) s.e exp (coefficient) s.e 
Age 0.976*** 0.008 0.971*** 0.006 0.869*** 0.004
Age^2 0.999** 0.000 0.999* 0.000 1.002*** 0.000
Female 0.864*** 0.022 1.665*** 0.035 0.935*** 0.015
Occupation (reference):       
Social- and health service 2.174*** 0.116 1.058 0.052 1.542*** 0.058
Public administration 0.790*** 0.041 1.339*** 0.057 0.931** 0.033
Commerce 0.787*** 0.048 1.127** 0.055 1.033 0.041
Agriculture/forestry 1.248*** 0.093 1.405*** 0.081 0.964 0.050
Transport 1.644*** 0.148 1.103 0.090 1.278*** 0.077
Manufacturing 1.099** 0.051 1.266*** 0.051 1.059* 0.034
Service 0.819*** 0.043 1.250*** 0.053 1.080** 0.038
Unclassified 0.398*** 0.020 1.287*** 0.052 1.326*** 0.042
Education (basic education):       
High school 1.317*** 0.038 1.089*** 0.024 1.032* 0.019
Secondary education 1.861*** 0.071 0.920*** 0.028 1.336*** 0.031
Undergraduate education 1.851*** 0.093 1.118*** 0.044 1.218*** 0.041
Graduate education 2.038*** 0.183 1.031 0.083 1.288*** 0.079
Province (Southern-Finland):       
Western-Finland 0.937** 0.026 1.301*** 0.029 0.913*** 0.016
Eastern-Finland 0.841*** 0.030 1.805*** 0.050 0.817*** 0.019
Oulu region 0.874*** 0.033 1.349*** 0.041 0.868*** 0.021
Lappi region 1.011 0.051 1.260*** 0.052 0.844*** 0.029
Distance to 500 days 
 (over 16 months):       
14 – 16 months 0.778*** 0.038 0.935* 0.036 0.759*** 0.025
11 – 13 months 0.664*** 0.043 0.919* 0.042 0.756*** 0.031
8 – 10 months 0.597*** 0.045 0.924 0.047 0.659*** 0.031
5 – 7 months 0.508*** 0.044 0.905* 0.051 0.643*** 0.034
2 – 4 months 0.470*** 0.045 0.833*** 0.050 0.587*** 0.034
-1 – 1months 0.446*** 0.040 0.888** 0.051 0.607*** 0.033
-4 – -2 months 0.381*** 0.038 0.962 0.060 0.594*** 0.036
-7 – -5 months 0.363*** 0.039 1.111* 0.069 0.525*** 0.034
-11 – -8 months 0.359*** 0.037 1.010 0.061 0.556*** 0.034
Over -11 months 0.219*** 0.014 0.992 0.038 0.499*** 0.018
Destination to activation period  
(over 16 months):       
15 – 16 months 0.909*** 0.031 0.883*** 0.029 0.881*** 0.021
13 – 14 months 0.884*** 0.039 1.052 0.038 0.907*** 0.026
11 – 12 months 0.846*** 0.045 0.953 0.039 0.780*** 0.027
9 – 10 months 0.876** 0.053 1.009 0.044 0.815*** 0.031
7 – 8 months 0.888* 0.060 1.026 0.047 0.861*** 0.035
5 – 6 months 0.936 0.068 0.956 0.047 0.872*** 0.038
3 – 4 months 0.938 0.073 1.052 0.053 0.815*** 0.038
1 – 2 months 0.934 0.077 1.180*** 0.061 0.862*** 0.041
0 – -1 months 0.809*** 0.064 0.991 0.050 0.785*** 0.037
-2 – -3 months 0.823** 0.067 1.302*** 0.065 0.870*** 0.040
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-4 – -5 months 0.977 0.085 1.476*** 0.077 0.936 0.046
-6 -7 months 0.976 0.136 1.195** 0.089 0.807*** 0.057
-8 – 9 months 1.001 0.125 1.541*** 0.099 0.998 0.061
-10 – -11 months 0.965 0.145 1.588*** 0.112 1.053 0.071
Over -11 months 0.881 0.133 1.349*** 0.094 1.163** 0.076
Duration of passive labour  
market support (1 – 2 months):       
3 – 4 months 1.379*** 0.041 1.974*** 0.060 1.991*** 0.044
5 – 6 months 1.487*** 0.065 2.565*** 0.106 2.303*** 0.072
7 – 8 months 1.425*** 0.080 2.970*** 0.148 3.019*** 0.116
9 – 10 months 1.480*** 0.100 3.280*** 0.186 2.933*** 0.134
11 – 12 months 1.154* 0.097 3.458*** 0.217 3.256*** 0.167
13 – 14 months 1.121 0.110 3.446*** 0.237 3.254*** 0.187
15 – 16 months 0.994 0.117 3.599*** 0.268 3.496*** 0.222
17 – 18 months 0.672** 0.105 3.443*** 0.280 3.474*** 0.245
19 – 20 months 0.742* 0.129 3.367*** 0.296 3.434*** 0.268
21 – 22 months 0.681* 0.141 3.255*** 0.312 3.339*** 0.288
23 – 24 months 0.802 0.177 3.154*** 0.328 3.574*** 0.334
25 – 26 months 0.412*** 0.137 2.873*** 0.335 3.671*** 0.378
27 – 28 months 0.535* 0.179 3.232*** 0.400 3.807*** 0.430
29 – 30 months 0.420** 0.179 2.229*** 0.349 3.323*** 0.433
31 – 32 months 0.383* 0.198 3.309*** 0.506 3.806*** 0.530
33 – 34 months 0.812 0.355 3.470*** 0.604 3.169*** 0.535
Over 34 months 0.299** 0.158 1.963*** 0.332 3.667*** 0.511
       
Mass point 2 1.818*** 0.152 -1.956*** 0.121 -3.203*** 0.103
P(mass point 2) 0.059* 0.034 0.789*** 0.025 0.325*** 0.039
Mass point 3 -2.139*** 0.144 2.529*** 0.111 -1.766*** 0.059
P(mass point 3) 0.619*** 0.114 0.044*** 0.005 0.522*** 0.032
       
Log likelihood -61820.773 -97054.023 -127258.190 
Number of observations 520180. * Significant at 10 %:level, **  Significant at 5 %:n level, **** Significant at 1 %:n level, Refer-
ence groups in parentheses. 
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